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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-vs-

Case No. 16223

EUGENE MYERS,
Defendant-Respondent,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with the
crime of rape in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-402.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Defendant was tried before a jury on December 11
and 12, 1978, in the Third Judicial District Court in and
for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Bryant H. Croft, presiding.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty.

At the sentencing

hearing, Judge Croft arrested the judgment, pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 77-34-1 and 2.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks an order of this Court

reversi~

the trial court's arrest of judgment and ordering the trial
court to sentence the defendant pursuant to the verdict of
the jury.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On the morning of May 18, 1978, at approximately
10:00 a.m., defendant approached Susan Delyle and Roberta
Fresh, both students with defendant in a paralegal

trainin~

course, in the parking lot of the Utah Technical College
and asked if he could join them for breakfast (Tr. 41), add:
that he would buy (Tr. 47).

Ms. Delyle and Ms. Fresh

drove in Ms. Fresh's car to the Hilton where they met
defendant in the foyer

(Tr. 42) .

t~

After breakfast, defendai:

offered to buy drinks at the Watergate, a private liquor
club (Tr. 43).

Defendant, Ms. Delyle, and Ms. Fresh

proceeded to the Watergate in Ms. Fresh's car, arriving
at the club at approximately 11:00 or 11:30 (Tr.

43 ).

Ms. Fresh left the Watergate at 1: 00 to pick up her grand·
mother from work (Tr. 45), and to change into her work
clothes.

Ms. Fresh was employed as a cocktail waitress at

a club known as the Iron Horse and changed into a black
halter dress, mid-thigh length (Tr. 63).

Ms. Fresh return;:

to the Watergate approximately 45 minutes later and join~
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defendant and Ms. Delyle.

Ms. Fresh and Ms. Delyle remained

at the Watergate until 3:30, at which time Ms. Fresh drove
Ms. Delyle to the University of Utah for a ballet lesson.
Concerning the approximate _four hours that the
defendant, Ms. Fresh and Ms. Delyle were at the Watergate,
Ms. Delyle testified at the trial that the three of them had
lunch and talked (Tr. 46).

She further testified that Ms.

Fresh never kissed defendant (Tr. 46), and that Ms. Fresh
was not intoxicated (Tr.

51).

After taking Ms. Delyle to the University of Utah,
Ms. Fresh returned to the Watergate (Tr. 67), and again
joined the defendant.

At the trial, Ms. Fresh testified

that she had one more drink (Tr. 69), and for the remainder
of the evening drank water to avoid becoming intoxicated
(Tr. 70).

Ms. Fresh remained at the Watergate with the

defendant until it closed at 1:00 or 2:00 a.m.

(Tr. 70).

Ms. Fresh further testified at the trial that she and the
defendant "talked about law" and danced (Tr. 70).

The

club manager, Mr. James K. Feraco, testified at trial that
he saw Ms. Fresh lying down in respondent's lap (Tr. 174),
and that he saw Ms. Fresh and respondent "necking"

(Tr. 175) ·

Defendant and Ms. Fresh left the Watergate and
Ms. Fresh testified she thought she was going to take
defendant to his car at the Hilton (Tr. 71) ·

Defendant
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asked Ms. Fresh to take him instead to the Holiday Inn on
North Temple, indicating that he wanted to see someone there
(Tr. 73).

At the Holiday Inn, defendant directed Ms.

Pre~

to drive to the back part of the parking lot, claiming his
friend had a room in that particular area (Tr. 74).
Defendant and Ms. Fresh talked for awhile about law.
Defendant told Ms. Fresh that she could make better money
doing something other than cocktail waitressing (Tr. 75),
indicating that Ms. Fresh could "work" for him as a
prostitute (Tr. 121), and that, if she would bestow sexual
favors on him, he would reward her financially (Tr. 121).
Ms. Fresh testified at the trial that she told defendant she
"wasn't interested".

(Tr. 76).

Defendant then asked Ms. Fre'

if her lack of interest had anything to do with the fact
that he was Black.

She responded that she had "very good

friends that are Black"
it on that level"

(Tr. 77), and she wanted to "keep

(Tr. 77), i.e., friends and no more.

Defendant became angry (Tr. 77), and yelled at Ms. Fresh
cal~ing

her derogatory names

(Tr. 79).

Ms. Fresh was

frightened by defendant's behavior and tried to get out of
the car (Tr. 81).
open the door.
at the keys.

She grabbed at her keys and tried to

Defendant restrained her, also grabbing
The key chain broke (Tr. 82), and the keys

fell to the floor.

Ms. Fresh began to cry and tried

once more to get out of the car.

Defendant pulled her
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back into the car by her hair (Tr. 82).

Once again, defendant

became angry and called Ms. Fresh offensive names

(Tr. 84).

At the trial, the following testimony was offered by the
victim:

Q. After he pulled you back in by
your hair, did he release your hair?
Did he grab a hold of you in any way?
A.
Yeah, he was sort of fumbling,
trying to fondle my breasts and trying
to kiss me and he had his arms around
me.
Q. Try and describe it and
explain it better. He pulled you in
by your hair and what did he do after
that?
A.
Just grabbed me and was, you
know-Q. Was he calling you names while
he was fondling you or trying to fondle
you?
A.
Yes, pretty much the same kind
of names.
Q. What parts of your body did
he touch?
A. At that point in time, just
my chest.
One of his hands was at
various times on my thigh.
Q.
What did you do while he was
touching you?
A.
cried and screamed, and "Please
don' t" , . you know.
Q.
Did you push him or did you
shove him or did you do anything?
A.
Yeah.
Q. What did you do?
A.
Pushed and shoved and screamed.
Q. What areas of Mr. Myers did you
push on?
A.
Just, I don't know, his shoulders,
his arms.
Q. When you say he tried to kiss
you, where was he trying to kiss you?
A.
My mouth.
Q.
He wasn't successful?
A.
Yeah.
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I

I

Q.
So what happened after that?
He got his arms around you and he has been
fondling and trying to kiss you; what
happened next?
A.
He was making-- he was saying
things about he knew that I wasn't sweet
and innocent and he thought I should
have intercourse with him.
And the
fondling and the whole bit was still
going on.

Defendant then pushed Ms. Fresh down on the seat
(Tr. 85), pulled up her dress and removed her pantyhose
(Tr. 87).

Defendant pinned Ms. Fresh's hands to the

seat with his knees and had intercourse with her.
Fresh told the defendant to leave.

Ms.

As he left, he warned

her to keep quiet:
A.
He started to get out of the
car and told me that if I told anyone
about it, he would see to it that-something about my neck wasn't worth
a whole lot and he didn't have to do
anything other than make a phone call
to see to it.
(Tr. 90).
After defendant left, Ms. Fresh drove home.

Unab:'

to find her house key and afraid to awaken and upset her
grandparents with whom she lived (Tr. 91) , Ms. Fresh drove
to a 7-11 Store nearby and called her girlfriend Julie
Erickson who told her to come over.

Ms. Fresh arrived~

her friend's house at approximately 4:45 a.m. and was ~t~
the door by Julie Erickson and her husband, Louie Muniz.
At the trial, Ms. Erickson testified that Ms. Fresh was
crying and her face and eyes were swollen; her dress was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ripped,

"the entire front of her dress was torn open";

"a large strip of hair was missing out of the back of her
head" (Tr. 134); and she had "red marks" on her arm (Tr.
135).

Mr. Muniz, Ms. Erickson's husband, testified at

trial that Ms. Fresh "looked like she had been roughed'up
a little bit.

Her dress was torn; her hair was kind of messed

up, had some markings on her arms" (Tr. 142).

Ms. Erickson

called the police and the Rape Crisis Center (Tr. 137).
In response to Ms. Erickson's call, one James Harrison, a
police officer employed by Salt Lake City Corporation,
arrived at the Erickson residence.

Officer Harrison testified

at trial that Ms. Fresh told him she had resisted the
defendant and tried to get out of the car two times (Tr.
171).

Officer Harrison accompanied Ms. Fresh to Holy Cross

Hospital where she was examined by Dr. John Geszon.
Dr. Geszon testified that he found "several areas
of bruising and scratches" (Tr. 28), and "a tan milky fluid
specimen in the vagina" upon examining Ms. Fresh.

Dr.

Geszon performed two tests to determine the presence of
sperm in Ms. Fresh's vagina:

The first test, called a "wet

mount" was performed and no evidence of sperm was present
(Tr. 34); however, the results of the second test, called a
"grandstand", showed evidence of sperm in the vagina.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
ARRESTING JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-34-1, ET SEQ.
BECAUSE THE FACTS PROVED AT TRIAL
CONSTITUTE A PUBLIC OFFENSE AND
ARE SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE
JURY'S VERDICT OF GUILTY.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-34-1, et seq. provides
that a motion in arrest of judgment can be made by the
defendant in a criminal action and that the motion may
be based, among other things, upon the ground that the
facts proved do not constitute a public offense.

The

statute further provides that the court on its own view
of any defects, can arrest the judgment without motion.
At the sentencing hearing in this case, the
trial court arrested the judgment pursuant to the above
statute. While appellant concedes that the trial court
has the power to arrest judgment in appropriate cases,
the State contends that the reasons the trial court
arrested the judgment in this case were insufficient
and that the decision to arrest judgment was an abuse
of discretion.
Appellant's contention that the trial court's
conduct was an abuse of discretion is based on the
facts here and case law.

A review of the facts shows

that the major weakness in the trial court's decision
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was that the judge arrested judgment because of his
own determination of the credibility of witnesses.
For example, Judge Croft, addressing the conflicting
testimonies of the victim and the club manager stated
at the sentencing hearing that "I think her (the
victim's] credibility leaves something to be desired
because I don't think that the manager of the club
would come in and testify to those facts if they
weren't in fact true."

(Tr.p.110).

At that point the

trial judge invaded the jury's exclusive province
to evaluate the credibility of witnesses and determine
the weight of evidence.
The standard for passing on a motion made
by the defednant for arrested judgment requires that
the trial court may not weigh the evidence to determine
whether the necessary quantum has been produced to
establish some proof of an element of the crime; the
trial court may only test or examine the legal sufficiencies
thereof because the jury is the sole and exclusive judge
of the weight of the evidence and of credibility of
witnesses.

State v. Randecker, 487 P.2d 1295 (Wash. 1971).

-9-
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In Randecker, the defendant was found guilt'•
1

of second degree forgery and grand larceny by embezzlement.

The trial judge granted a motion in arrest of

judgment and the State appealed.

The Supreme Court of

Washington held that there was substantial evidence
from which the jury could reasonably have concluded
there was sufficient proof of the crime and that the
motion in arrest of judgment should not have been
granted.

The Randecker Court stated:
• • • the [trial] court is only
empowered to determine whether there
is "substantial evidence" tending to
establish circumstances on which a
necessary element of a crime may be
predicated. However, whether the
circumstances tending to connect the
defendant with the crime, or tending
to establish intent exclude, to a
moral certainty, every other reasonable
hy~othesis than that of the defendant's
guilt, is again a question for the jury.
[Citations omitted.]

Id. at 1299 (emphasis added).
The court went on to state:
The fact that a trial or appellate
court may conclude the evidence is not
convincing or may find the evidence
hard to reconcile in some of its aspects,
or may think some evidence appears to
refute on negative guilt, or to cast
doubt thereon does not justify the co~rt~
setting aside the jury's verdict.
[Citations omitted. ]
Id. at 1299 (emphasis added) .
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Thus, it is unnecessary, even irrelevant, for
the trial court to be satisfied of the defendant's
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

It is only necessary

for it to be satisfied that there is "substantial ,
evidence" to support either the State's case or the
particular element in question.

When that quantum of

evidence has been presented, there is some proof of the
element of crime in question and an arrest of judgment
should not be granted.
In this case the testimony at trial establishes
the facts sufficient to constitute a public offense.
Yet

Judge Croft chose to disregard the facts presented

at trial--chose to reject the jury's conclusions as to the
evidence and the credibility of witnesses--and made the
following statement at the sentencing hearing:
There isn't anybody in this courtroom
that will ever live to see a more invited
rape, if there was a rape, than is
evidence in this case.
Tr. at 108.
In a recent Colorado case, the defendant was
charged with felony menacing and impersonating a police
officer. The court granted the defendant a judgment of
acquittal notwithstanding the verdict of the jury.

The

Supreme Court of Colorado held in People v. Noga, 586
P.2d 1003 (Colo. 1978), that the standard for upsetting
a jury verdict is very strict and the trial judge may
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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-

• • • if a determination of the
defendant's guilt rests upon the
credibility of witnesses or the weight
to be accorded evidence, the case must
be submitted to the jury, for these
matters are solely within its province.
Id. at 1003.
In this case, the only testimony that
contradicted the testimony of the victim was that of
the club manager, Mr. Feraco.

Whether the jury believe:

his testimony or that of the victim and other state
witnesses, the jury acted within its sole province in
assessing the credibility of the witnesses to reach a
decision.
The trial court in this case did not leave
the matter of credibility of witnesses or determinatior:
of the weight of the evidence to the jury.

(Only in er

where the judge tries a case without a jury can he pass
on the credibility of witnesses.
P.2d 290 (Utah 1962).)

DeVas v. Noble, 369

Instead, based on the trial

judge's disbelief of the victim's testimony, the court
chose to override the jury verdict and arrest judg~~·

-12-
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• • • as a judge of this court, I
cannot close my eyes to the fact situation that for this long period during
that day these two people were in friendly
contact [and] association, necking with
each other and participating in the kind _
of activity that ultimately might well lead
to sexual relations.
•
Tr. at 113.
Judge Croft further discredited the testimony
of the victim and stated:
• • • If she [the victim] had been
able to get into her grandmother's home,
I wonder whether or not we would have
heard anything about this case. I doubt
it.
Tr. at 113.
Judge Croft ignored the evidence presented
at trial.

He ignored the facts which were undisputed

of the medical examination results and the testimony of
Dr. John Geszon.

He discredited as unbelievable the

testimony of Susan DeLyle, Julie Ericson, Louis Muniz
and the victim herself.
Judge Croft decided that the jury verdict
could not stand:
But sometimes juries [sic] make
mistakes, just as judges make mistakes
when we have to render judgments in cases
we try without a jury. None of.us are .
perfect. And I think that the J~ry verdict
in this case left much to be desired from a
point of view of justice under the facts and
circumstances of the case.
Tr. at 114 (emphasis added).
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Appellant asserts that the trial court's
action in arresting judgment was an abuse of
discretion and should be vacated by this Court.

A.
THE EVIDENCE IS
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE
CONVICTION OF RAPE.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-402 (Supp. 1977),
defines the crime of rape as follows:
A male person commits rape
when he has sexual intercourse
with a female, not his wife,
without her consent.
Appellant avers that the evidence adduced
at the trial is sufficient to support the verdict
of the jury and thus the trial court's arrest of
judgment was improper and an abuse of discretion.
The standard used to review the sufficiency
of evidence was established in State v. Ward, 347
P.2d 865 (Utah 1959):
The rules governing the scope of
review on appeal as to the sufficiency
of the evidence to sustain the verdict
are well settled: That it is the
prerogative of the jury to judge the
credibility of the witnesses and to
determine the facts; that the evidence
will be renewed in the light most
favorable to the verdict, and that if
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whe~ so v~ewed it appears that the jury

acting fairly and reasonably guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt, the verdict
will not be disturbed.
Id. at 869

(emphasis added).
This Court reiterated that general rule ln

a recent case, State v. Sharp,

P.2d

(Utah

1979), and added that "the question of which testimony

is to be believed is for the trier of fact and this
Court will not substitute its own judgment for that of
the jury unless it is clear that the testimony given is
completely unbelievable."

(Emphasis added.)

Citing

State v. Middelstadt, 579 P.2d 908 (Utah 1978), and
State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66 (Utah 1977).

The standard

for the trial court, however, does not look at whether
a reasonable person could find the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt, but only must determine if
there is sufficient evidence to establish some proof
of an element of the crime.

Thus, in passing on a

defendant's motion in arrest of judgment or on its
own motion, the Court cannot weigh the evidence to
determine whether the necessary quantumhasbeen produced
because this would invade the province of the jury to
judge the weight of the evidence; the trial court can
only test the legal sufficiency of the evidence.

Thus,

if substantial evidence exists as it does in this case,
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whether the "circumstances tending to connect the
defendant with the crime or tending to establish
intent exclude, to a moral certainty every other
reasonable hypothesis than that of the defendant's
guilt" is not for the trial judge to determine--it is
strictly a question for the jury.

See State v. Randeck'

supra.
The most pertinent issue in judging the
sufficiency of the evidence in this case is consent.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-406 (1) and (2) defines "without
consent" as follows:
An act of sexual intercourse, sodomy,
or sexual abuse is without consent of the
victim. • •
(1)
When the actor compels the victim
to submit or participate by force that
overcomes such earnest resistance as might
reasonably be expected under the circumstance'
or
(2)
The actor compels the victim to
submit or participate by any threat that
would prevent resistance by a person of
ordinary resolution.
To determine whether a victim consented, this
Court has looked to her age, strength, surrounding fact:
State v. Ward, supra, to "threats of immediate and grea:
bodily harm which create in the mind of the female a
real apprehension of dangerous consequences," State_!·
Nunez, 520 P.2d 882 (Utah 1974); to whether she took
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advantage of a reasonable opportunity to escape or
otherwise seek help, State v. Horne, 12 Utah 2d 162, 364
P.2d 109 (1961); and to the conduct of the victim after
commission of the assault.

State v. Roberts, 91 utah

117, 63 P.2d 585 (1937).
A usual occurrence in the trial of a rape
case is that the defendant's version of what occurred
differs significantly from the evidence presented by
the State.

In such a situation, this Court has in the

past accepted the assumption that the jury believed
that which supports their verdict.

See State v. Wilcox,

28 Utah 2d 71, 498 P.2d 357 (1972); State v. Siddoway,
61 Utah 189, 211 Pac. 968 (1922).
In its instructions to the jury, the trial
court submitted Instruction No. 10 (Record, p. 79),
which explained "without consent" as defined by
statute; Instruction No. 12 (Record p. 81), which
enumerated the four elements of the crime of rape which
the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.
"Reasonable doubt" was defined by this Court in State v.
Williamson, 22 Utah 245, 62 Pac. 1022 (1900), as:
• • • not a mere imaginary, captious,
or a possible doubt, but a fair doubt,,based
upon reason and common sense, and grow~ng
out of the testimony of the case. It is
such a doubt as will leave the juror's
mind, after careful examination of all the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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evidence in such condition that he cannot
say that he has an abiding conviction to
a moral certainty of the defendant's guilt.
Id. at 1024.
There is a presumption that the jury wilJ.
follow the instructions given to them by the court,
this case, appellant submits the jury weighed the
evidence according to the instructions given.
To best establish the sufficiency of the
evidence it is necessary to explore all elements oft
crime.
As to the first element, that respondent hao
sexual intercourse with the victim, not his wife, the
following evidence was introduced at trial:

the vict

testified that respondent had intercourse with her ('.:
p.87); the victim's friend, Julie Erickson, testifiec
that the victim told her that respondent forced her r
intercourse (Tr.p.134). Mr. Erickson's husgand, Louis
Muniz, testified that he had been told by the victim
that she had been raped (Tr .p .142); and the testimony
Dr. John Geszon, who testified as to the results of

L

tests which indicated that intercourse had occurred'
as to the condition of the victim's body.

-18Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

No evidence was presented nor any defense
raised that the victim was respondent's wife.
The next element is that such act of sexual
intercourse occurred without the consent of the victim.
To prove the element of lack of consent, the following
evidence was presented at trial:

the testimony of the

victim that she tried on two occasions to get out of the
car (Tr.p.82); that respondent tore at her clothes and
pinned her arms down so she could not move (Tr.p.84);
that she screamed and yelled (Tr.p.84); Dr. Geszon's
testimony as to the bruises, contusions, etc. on the
victim's body; and the testimony of those persons who
had contact with the victim soon after the rape occurred:
the testimony of Julie Erickson that the victim told
her she had been raped (Tr.p.134); the testimony of Louie
Muniz that the victim was upset and crying and looked
roughed up and had a chunk of hair missing from the back
of her head (Tr.p.142); and the testimony of the police
officer who escorted the victim to the hospital (Tr.p.171).
Recently, in State v. Studham, 572 P.2d 700
(Utah 1977), this Court held that the evidence was
sufficient to establish the use of force and the absence
of consent.

In Studham, the prosecutrix and defendant

had lived together at one time.

-19-

One night the defendant
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knocked on the prosecutrix's door but she refused to
let him in.

He kicked the door open and remained in

the prosecutrix' s apartment for abo1:1t two hours, during
which time there was "some kissing and amorous advances,'
At the trial the prosecutrix testified that the defendar.:
pinned her to the floor during a struggle and "forced
intercourse upon her against her will."

The prosecutrix

did not scream or attempt to run; her only visible
injuries were a bruised face and cut lip.

The defendant

argued on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to
prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that the
evidence is "inherently improbable and inconsistent,"
because, although the victim claims force and denies
consent she did not scream or try to escape.

In

rejecting the defendant's argument in Studham, this Cou::
rejected the traditional requirement that the woman
"must resist to the utmost" and stated:
Even though it is necessary that the
rape be against the victim's will, manife~t
by a determined effort on her part to resist·,
it is not necessary that it be shown that
she engaged in any heroics which subjected
her to great brutality or that she suff~r7d
or risked serious wounds or injuries (citing
State v. Ward, supra).
Id. at 702.

-20-
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See also State v. Horne, 364 P.2d 109 (Utah 1961).
The Court went on to establish a new standard to
determine the issue of consent:
What we think is a sounder view
recognizes that the bruising and
terrorizing of the sense and
sensibilities can be just as real
and just as wrong as the beating and
brusing of the flesh;and that the
law should afford a woman protection,
not only from physical violence, but
from having her feelings and sensibilities outraged by force or fear in
violation of what she is entitled to
regard and protect as the integrity of
her person. Accordingly, in determining
whether the victim's will and resistance
were overcome, it is appropriate to consider
that this may be accomplished by either
physical force and violence, or by
psychological or emotional stress imposed
upon her, or by a combination of them. As
to the degree of resistance required: The
victim need do no more than her age and
her strength of body and mind make it
reasonable for her to do under the
circumstances to resist. In this case
there is a reasonable basis in the
evidence upon which the jury could believe
beyond a reasonable doubt that the test
was met.
Thus, the most critical elements of the
crime charged, (1) that intercourse did occur with a
woman not his wife and (2) that it was without the
victim's consent, are adequately supported by the facts
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and evidence introduced at trial.

The conflicting

testimony presented by the club manager that the
victim and respondent were necking does not constitute
consent.
In State v. Studharn, supra, the Court
refers to the "kissing and amorous advances" that
occurred prior to the rape.

Yet this behavior

does not invite the act nor imply consent.
Appellant submits that the evidence
adduced at trial is sufficient to sustain the
conviction of the respondent.

-22-
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B.

THE VICTIM'S TESTIMONY
ALONE, IF NOT UNREASONABLE, IS
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE CONVICTION OF RESPONDENT.
In many crimes, the only two persons who can.
testify about what actually occurred are the victim and the
perpetrator.

It is natural that each version of what

occurred is significantly different.

Nevertheless, many

courts have noted that in cases of sexual abuse or assault,
the testimony of the victim alone is sufficient to support
a conviction.
The

~rizona

Supreme Court has held in State v.

Williams, 111 Ariz. 175, 526 P.2d 714 (1974), a rape case,
that:
A conviction may be had on the
basis of the uncorroborated testimony
of the prosecutrix unless the story
is physically impossible or so incredible that no reasonable person
could belive it.
Id. at 716-717.
See also, State v. Hodges, 14 Utah 2d 197,

381 P.2d 81

(1963), and May v. State, 89 Nev. 277, 510 P.2d 1368
( 19 73) .
In the case of State v. Studham, 572 P.2d 700
(Utah, 1977), this Court stated that where the question of
guilt or innocence depends upon weighing the credibility
of the victim against that of the accused:
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The rule is that if there is
nothing so inherently incredible
about the victim's story that
reasonable minds would reject it,
a conviction may rest upon her
testimony alone.
Id. at 702.
See also, State v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d, 34, 347 P.2d 867 (1959),
and State v. Mills, 530 P.2d 1272

(Utah

1975).

In a recent Wyoming case, Brown v. State, 581 P.2i
189

(Wyo. 1978), the Supreme Court of Wyoming sustained a

conviction of rape on the uncorroborated testimony of the
prosecutrix.

In Brown, after the prosecutrix and defendant

had enjoyed a pleasant dinner together, the prosecutrix
asked the defendant to take her to her car.

The

defenda~

told her they were "going to Harry's for awhile."

The

prosecutrix told defendant she couldn't stay long.

The

defendant grabbed her arm and pulled her over to him.

On

arriving at Harry's, the defendant pulled her from the car;
inside the house he pushed her into one

of the bedrooms.

The defendant started tearing at her clothes and pulling
at her panty hose and underwear.
to stop, but he did not.

The prosecutrix asked hin

Not unlike this case, the prosecm

testified at trial that "she does not have any idea or
memory of how he got off her dress

(Tr.p.125), and further,

that "she did not scratch, bite, or kick him" because she
was afraid for her life.

The bruises on the 1'.)rosecutrix'

body were, as here, minimal, but the doctor who examined
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her found her "very emotionally upset and very distraught."
The Court determined that the tears in the dress and pantyhose, together with the bruises and scratches and her
emotional condition could not be ignored in evaluating the
evidence.

The court differentiated between submission'

and consent and stated that "acquiescence is not consent if
induced by fear or reasonable apprehension of bodily harm."
In the instant case, the victim testified that she told
the respondent to stop (Tr.p.85), but that he did not do
so, telling her that she would enjoy it (Tr.p.87 ) .
The testimony of the victim is not uncorroborated:
the testimony of Dr. Geszon about her bruises and scratches
(Tr.p. 28), and the positive results of the tests to
determine the presence of sperm; the testimony of Julie
Erickson, Louie Muniz, and Officer Harrison as to the
victim's emotional state; the evidence of the torn dress
and ruined pantyhose all corroborate the commission of a
rape.
Appellant submits that the testimony of the
prosecutrix is not unreasonable and, corroborated by
the testimony of Dr. Geszon, Julie Erickson and Louie
Muniz, together with the torn dress and pantyhose is
sufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury and should
not have been rejected by the trial judge.

-25-
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c.
IT IS THE EXCLUSIVE PROVINCE
OF THE JURY TO DETERMINE THE
CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES.
It is well-settled in Utah that it is the preroga'.
of the jury to weigh the evidence and determine the
credibility of witnesses.
{Utah

See State v. James, 89 P.460

1907); State v. Green, 911 P.987 (Utah

1908). The

jury may accept or reject all or any part of the witness'
testimony.

People v. Gardner, 530 P.2d 496 (Colo. 1975).
In this case, the jury received instructions

regarding the criteria to be used in judging the credibilit;
of witnesses {see Instruction No. 3, Record p. 72).

Usi~

the instructions given them, the jury concluded that the
testimony of the prosecutrix was convincing and credible;
that the corroborative testimony of Julie Erickson and her
husband, Louis Muniz, were believable, and that the testirnc:
of the doctor as to his findings on examination of the
victim supported the allegation of rape made by the
prosecutrix and proved by the State.
When evidence is conflicting, as between the
testimony of the club manager and the prosecutrix, as to
events which did or did not occur, the jury as fact finder
the duty to decide who to believe.
M

State in Interest.£!

S _ , 584 P.2d 914 (Utah, 1976).

There is

substantial evidence in the trial record for the jury to
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conclude that the prosecutrix's allegations were
true and thus reach a verdict of guilty.
In State v. Harless, 459 P.2d 210 (Utah, 1969),
this Court held the evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction
for rape and reviewed the record with the assumption that the
jury believed those aspects of the evidence which supported
their verdict.

In Harless, as in the instant case, the issue of

consent was paramount:

the defendant claimed that the

alleged force occurring in such a restrictive space (inside
the car) was not "only inherently improbable, but physically
impossible."

The Court recognized that neither the victim

nor the jury saw the facts in the same light as did the
defendant and stated:
. . . it is their [the jury's]
exclusive prerogative to judge the
credibility of the evidence and to
determine the facts; and we do not
regard the evidence given and the
verdict rendered as being so inherently imp·robable that no reasonable
minds could so believe, in which event
we do not disturb them.
(Citations omitted)

(emphasis added).

Likewise, the trial court should not have arrested
judgment solely because the trial judge disagreed with the
conclusions reached by the jury.
Appellant submits that the trial court erred in
arresting judgment based on the judge's personal opinion of
the

credibility

of witnesses, since that responsibility is

the exclusive province of the jury.
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POINT II
THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE IS
NOT A BAR TO THE IMPOSITION OF SE~"'rENCE
PURSUANT TO THE VERDICT OF THE JURY.
The underlying premise of double jeopardy
is that a defendant should not be twice tried or
punished for the same offense.

Where there is no

threat of multiple prosecution the double jeopardy
clause is not offended.

See State v. Allen, 557 P.2d

176 (Ariz. 1976).
The United States Supreme Court in United
States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 95 S.Ct. 1013, 43
L.Ed.2d 232 (1975), discusses the history and
of the double jeopardy clause.

princ~~

In Wilson, the defe::da::

was found guilty by a jury of converting union
in violation of a federal statute.

fu.~ds

The Court disnisse:

the indictment on a post verdict motion.

The

~nited

States Supreme Court held that when a judge rules

~ ..

favor of the defendant after a guilty verdict has

bee~

returned by the trier of ::act, the government r:iay a;:;:e;.
without contravening the double jeopardy clause, s:..:::e
if the government prevails the ef::ect would be to
reinstate the guilty verdict and ~here will ~ot be a

second trial.

The Wilson Court stated:

-28-
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Although review of any ruling
of law discharging a defendant
obviously enhances the likelihood of
conviction and submits him to continuing
expense and anxiety, a defendant has
no legitimate claim to benefit from an
error of law when that error could be
corrected w~thout subjecting him to
a second trial before a second trier
of fact.
Id. at 1023.
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals in
a recent Oklahoma case, State v. Robinson, 544 P.2d 545
(Okla. 1975), stated that an appeal from an order arresting
judgment may be received by an appellate court and "if
the trial court's order arresting judgment is incorrect,
the appellate court may direct the trial court to vacate
the order in arrest of judgment and sentence the defendant
in accordance with the law or the verdict of the jury."
The court went on to state:
The order in arrest of judgment
does not operate to discharge the
defendant nor prohibit pronouncement
of judgment and sentence.
Id. at 549.
Appellant asserts that the granting of an
arrest of judgment in this case does not operate as an
acquittal but only places the defendant in the same
situation he was prior to the prosecution of his case;
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and the double jeopardy clause is not offended.
If the relief which appellant seeks on
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-39-4

(1953),

is denied by this Court, the State will not be
permitted to bring a second prosecution against
respondent for the same offense, because there would
be two trials and two times in jeopardy; however, if
appellant prevails on appeal, then the case must go
back to the District Court for sentencing pursuant
the verdict of the jury.

~

Regardless of the result,

the double jeopardy clause is not a bar to the State's
appeal in this case.

Respondent would not be tried nor

punished twice for the same offense; the judgment of
guilty as determined by the jury will cease to be
arrested and will be reinstated so that the respondent
may be sentenced in accordance with the verdict of
the jury.
CONCLUSION
Appellant asks this Court to vacate the arrest
of judgment ordered in the trial court and reinstate the
jury verdict so that the respondent may be sentenced
pursuant to statute.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
CRAIG L. BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
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